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IF HE MAKES YOU QUIT, WE’RE NOT LIABLE: 
HOW PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE V. SUDERS 
UNNECESSARILY COMPLICATES TITLE VII 
LAWSUITS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rosemary Martin was a model employee, receiving two “Employee-of-
the-Month” awards during her tenure as Director of Payroll and Personnel 
at the Cavalier Hotel in Virginia Beach, Virginia.1 Unfortunately, her 
employment at the Hotel was not model at all because her supervisor, Dan 
Batchelor, spent the greater part of four years making her working life 
miserable.2 What began as verbal abuse escalated to much more serious 
activity when, on at least three occasions, Batchelor sexually assaulted 
Martin.3 Martin resigned shortly thereafter and filed a lawsuit alleging 
sexual harassment against Batchelor and the Cavalier Hotel.4 
Fortunately for Martin, she filed her lawsuit in 1993,5 and the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the jury verdict she won against Batchelor and the Hotel in 
1995.6 The result of Martin’s suit would have been different had it been 
filed today, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania State 
Police v. Suders.7 Suders is a direct outgrowth of two cases the Supreme 
Court decided in 1998.8 In those two cases, Burlington Industries v. 
Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court set out an 
affirmative defense for employers that can be used only when there is no 
“tangible employment action” at issue in the litigation.9 If there is a 
 1. Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1348 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 2. Id. at 1349. In 1988, Batchelor “attempted to kiss Martin and on another [occasion] he 
nudged her and told her he wanted to take her to a hotel and ‘stick something between her legs.’” Id. 
 3. Id. “In February of [1992], Batchelor called Martin into his office, placed a ‘Meeting in 
Progress’ sign on his office door, locked it, put his hand over her mouth to prevent her from 
screaming, and committed oral and anal sodomy on her.” Id. “At the beginning of March, Batchelor 
asked Martin to remain after a regularly scheduled senior staff meeting in one of the hotel conference 
rooms, locked the door, and forced her to engage in oral sex.” Id. “At the end of March, Batchelor 
raped Martin.” Id. 
 4. Id. at 1348. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 1360. 
 7. 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004). 
 8. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 
U.S. 775 (1998). 
 9. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (“[n]o affirmative defense is available, however, when the 
supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or 
undesirable reassignment”). 
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tangible employment action at issue, the employer can be held strictly 
liable for the actions of its supervisors.10 Between 1998 and 2004, the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals struggled to accurately interpret the phrase “tangible 
employment action” and to determine whether a constructive 
discharge11—where an employee such as Martin quits because the abuse at 
work has rendered her atmosphere intolerable—fits within that rubric.12 
Unfortunately, Suders, decided in 2004, did not lessen the burden on 
trial and appellate courts in answering these questions. In fact, the question 
presented to the Supreme Court required a simple yes or no answer: 
“When a hostile work environment created by a supervisor culminates in a 
constructive discharge, may the employer assert the affirmative defense 
recognized in” Ellerth and Faragher?13 Instead of answering yes or no, 
however, the Court created an additional layer of analysis for federal 
courts to undertake in order to reach the issue of whether this affirmative 
defense may be asserted.14 
The doctrine of constructive discharge was developed by the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) in the 1930s “to address situations 
where employers coerced employees into resigning because the employees 
had engaged in statutorily-protected collective bargaining activities.”15 
Early cases at the appellate level met with little success16 until 1953, when 
 10. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (“[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or 
successively higher) authority over the employee”). 
 11. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2345 (explaining constructive discharge as asking the question: “Did 
working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would 
have felt compelled to resign?”). 
 12. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003); Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., 
Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003); Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003); Jaros v. LodgeNet 
Entm’t Corp., 294 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2002); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Turner v. Dowbrands, No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599 (6th Cir. June 26, 2000); Caridad v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 13. Pa. State Police v. Suders, No. 03-95 (Docket) (U.S. July 17, 2003), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/03-00095qp.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2004). 
 14. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355–56; see also infra Part II.E. 
 15. Cathy Shuck, Comment, That’s It, I Quit: Returning to First Principles in Constructive 
Discharge Doctrine, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 401, 406 (2002) (“[t]he NLRB appears to have 
first used the term ‘constructive discharge’ in 1938”); see also In the Matter of Sterling Corset Co., 9 
N.L.R.B. 858, 865 (1938) (“[T]he respondents’ efforts to destroy the Union culminated in Davis’ 
speech to the employees on April 20, and the constructive discharges which followed”) (emphasis 
added). 
 16. NLRB v. Waples-Platter Co., 140 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1944). The officers of Waples-Platter 
Company had been intimidating employees because the officers did not want the employees to join a 
union. Id. at 228–29. This decision may have been influenced by its time in history; the activities 
giving rise to the lawsuit took place in 1942, during the early years of World War II. The Fifth Circuit 
alluded to this when it held that the complaining employees “were not constructively discharged. They 
elected to quit the service of the Corporation . . . at a time when vacancies were occurring and when 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/12
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the First Circuit upheld an NLRB decision on behalf of an employee who 
was constructively discharged.17 After the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 196418 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196719 
(“ADEA”), the constructive discharge doctrine20 firmly entered 
employment law jurisprudence.21 
Unlike the long and distinguished history of constructive discharge, the 
phrase “tangible employment action” appears to have entered employment 
discrimination law in 1998 with the Ellerth22 and Faragher decisions.23 
While courts had used similar phrases to describe an action taken by an 
employer that adversely affects an employee’s economic livelihood, these 
decisions marked the first appearance of this specific phrase in 
employment discrimination law.24 
This Note examines both the struggle that circuit courts have faced 
since 1998 in determining whether a constructive discharge is a tangible 
employment action and the subsequent struggle courts are likely to face 
labor was sorely needed. A vacancy occurred at the garage for the reason a worker there had been 
inducted into the armed forces.” Id. at 230. 
 17. NLRB v. Saxe-Glassman Shoe Corp., 201 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1953). The facts of Saxe-
Glassman supported “ample justification for the conclusion that [an employee] was forced to quit in 
the face of discriminatory treatment calculated to make her job unbearable.” Id. at 243. 
 18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000). 
 20. Constructive discharge has often been defined as occurring when “an employer renders the 
employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced to quit.” Duncan v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 935 (8th Cir. 2002). In the wake of Suders, lower courts will likely adopt 
the definition of the doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court instead of its Circuit. See McPherson v. 
City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 440 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Suders, holding that to show constructive 
discharge in the Title VII context, an employee must prove “that the abusive working environment was 
so intolerable that her resignation was an appropriate response”); see supra note 11. 
 21. See generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Oubre v. Entergy 
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Rutan v. 
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989); 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 
(1988); Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984). 
 22. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 23. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The Supreme Court claimed that “[t]he concept of a tangible 
employment action appears in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals discussing claims involving 
race, age, and national origin discrimination, as well as sex discrimination.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
In reality, the cases it cited use different phrases, but the meaning is the same. See supra note 21.  
 24. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[w]e conclude that 
Kocsis has not suffered a materially adverse employment action.”); Harlston v. McDonnell-Douglas 
Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[c]hanges in duties or working conditions that cause no 
materially significant disadvantage, such as Harlston’s reassignment, are insufficient to establish the 
adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case.”); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 
456 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he district court subsequently granted GRI’s motion for summary judgment on 
the ADEA claims, finding that Flaherty had not suffered an adverse employment action under that 
statute”). 
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following Suders.25 Part II examines the short history of the impasse from 
the Supreme Court’s instructions in Ellerth and Faragher to cases decided 
only months before Suders, and concludes with a brief description of 
Justice Ginsburg’s rationale in Suders. Part III analyzes these decisions, 
demonstrating that constructive discharge ought to qualify as a tangible 
employment action and render the Ellerth defense inapplicable. Finally, 
Part IV argues that Congress is best situated to resolve this issue, and 
suggests the appropriate focus in doing so. 
II. HISTORY 
A. The Supreme Court in 1998 
1. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton26 
The saga begins with Beth Ann Faragher, who worked as a part-time 
lifeguard in Boca Raton, Florida, from 1985 to 1990.27 During this period, 
her male supervisors, Bill Terry and David Silverman, repeatedly harassed 
her and other female lifeguards.28 Faragher resigned in June 1990.29 
Faragher and a fellow lifeguard, Nancy Ewanchew, brought a sexual 
harassment lawsuit against the City, Terry, and Silverman in 1992.30 The 
district court ruled in favor of Faragher on the Title VII claim, but awarded 
her only one dollar in nominal damages.31 Initially, an Eleventh Circuit 
panel reversed the judgment against the City.32 The following year, the 
 25. See supra note 12. 
 26. 542 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 27. Id. at 780. 
 28. Id. at 780–82. “During that 5-year period, Terry repeatedly touched the bodies of female 
employees without invitation, [and] would put his arms around Faragher, with his hand on her 
buttocks.” Id. at 782 (internal citations omitted). “[Silverman] once tackled Faragher and remarked 
that, but for a physical characteristic he found unattractive, he would readily have had sexual relations 
with her. Another time he pantomimed an act of oral sex.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 29. Id. at 780. 
 30. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 864 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 
 31. Id. at 1564. This ruling was conditioned in part on general agency principles. Because “the 
two harassers in this action, Terry and Silverman, were acting as agents of the City, the City is directly 
liable.” Id. 
 32. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 784–85; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 
1996). The Eleventh Circuit panel held that because there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
that Terry and Silverman were “acting within the scope of their employment in subjecting Faragher to 
offensive language, gestures, and touching . . . the district court erred in holding the City directly liable 
for that conduct.” Id. at 1166. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/12
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Eleventh Circuit heard the case en banc and affirmed the panel in a 7-to-5 
decision.33 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Faragher, as well as its decision to 
grant certiorari, rested in part on the fact that “Courts of Appeals have 
struggled to derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for 
hostile environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.”34 
The Supreme Court examined the types of scenarios in which an employer 
should be held responsible for harassment perpetrated by its supervisors 
upon subordinates:35 (1) cases where the employer had actual knowledge 
of the harassment;36 (2) cases where the “individual charged with creating 
the abusive atmosphere . . . was indisputably within that class of an 
employer organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s 
proxy;”37 and (3) cases where the employer took “discriminatory 
employment actions with tangible results, like hiring, firing, promotion, 
compensation, and work assignment.”38 
The Court examined the history of each of these justifications for 
employer vicarious liability in combination with Title VII’s preventive 
policy39 and developed a framework to clarify this area of the law.40 By 
 33. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc). 
 34. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785. It is important to note that the struggle only arises under 
allegations of hostile work environment, not in quid pro quo lawsuits. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore 
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[w]hen a supervisor requires sexual favors 
as quid pro quo for job benefits, the supervisor, by definition, acts as the company”). 
 35. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789–91. 
 36. There are “myriad cases [where] District Courts and Courts of Appeals have held employers 
liable on account of actual knowledge by the employer . . . of sufficiently harassing action.” Id. at 789 
(citing EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 
1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983)). 
 37. Id.; see also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 634 n.11 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding abusive 
supervisor held a sufficiently high position in the company’s hierarchy); Burns v. McGregor Elec. 
Indus., Inc., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding harasser was owner of company, so was 
company for all intents and purposes); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255 (holding by implication that when a 
“proprietor, partner or corporate officer participates personally in the harassing behavior,” the 
employer company will be found liable). 
 38. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790. The Supreme Court approvingly reiterated its holding in Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), that agency principles for imputing liability to the 
employer is appropriate in some cases. Id.; see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70–72. In addition to common law 
agency principles, Congress deliberately included any agent of an employer within the scope of Title 
VII, and this “surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which 
employers are to be held responsible under Title VII.” Id. at 72. 
 39. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–807. Title VII’s primary objective, according to the Court, “like 
that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm.” Id. 
at 806 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)). 
 40. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable 
hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority 
over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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creating an affirmative defense for employers who had reasonable 
preventive procedures in place, the Court attempted to influence 
employers’ behavior to stop harassment before it escalates rather than to 
simply provide remedies to aggrieved employees.41 This defense would 
not be available “when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a 
tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable 
reassignment.”42 In these situations, strict liability would still govern Title 
VII claims.43 The Court failed to further define “tangible employment 
action” in Faragher, but Ellerth, decided the same day, helped to explain 
this phrase.44 
2. Burlington Industries v. Ellerth45 
Kimberly Ellerth was employed as a salesperson at Burlington 
Industries in Chicago, Illinois.46 During the fourteen month period that she 
worked there, Ted Slowik, a midlevel manager at Burlington, verbally 
harassed her repeatedly.47 Ellerth requested and received a right-to-sue 
letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)48 
raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage 
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise. 
Id. 
 41. Id. at 805–06. The Court added the defense in order to provide employers with an incentive 
to create appropriate policies to prevent harassment. Id. at 806. The new requirement that employees 
bear some duty of care comports well with the doctrine of mitigation. The Court points out that under 
“the general theory of damages, . . . a victim has a duty ‘to use such means as are reasonable under the 
circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages’ that result from violations of the statute.” Id. 
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.15 (1982)). 
 42. Id. at 808. This is the language that has played a central role in judicial interpretation of the 
affirmative defense. See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 43. See supra note 8. 
 44. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742. 
 45. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 46. Id. at 747. 
 47. Id. at 747–48. “When Ellerth was being considered for a promotion, Slowik expressed 
reservations during the promotion interview because [Ellerth] was not ‘loose enough.’ [This] comment 
was followed by his reaching over and rubbing her knee.” Id. at 748. The month Ellerth quit, she 
called Slowik to ask “permission to insert a customer’s logo into a fabric sample. Slowik responded, ‘I 
don’t have time for you right now, Kim . . . unless you want to tell me what you’re wearing.’” Id. 
Several days later, Slowik again harassed Ellerth, this time asking her, “are you wearing shorter skirts 
yet, Kim, because it would make your job a whole heck of a lot easier.” Id. 
 48. Before filing Title VII lawsuits, claimants must have “filed a timely complaint with the 
EEOC and obtained a right-to-sue letter.” Shah v. New York State Dept. of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 
613 (2d Cir. 1999). Title VII mandates this. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f) (2000). 
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and filed suit in October 1994 “alleging Burlington engaged in sexual 
harassment and forced her constructive discharge, in violation of Title 
VII.”49 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Burlington.50 The Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, “reversed in a decision 
which produced eight separate opinions and no consensus for a controlling 
rationale.”51 Just as with Faragher, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
“to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer liability [in Title 
VII lawsuits].”52 
Beginning with general agency principles, the Court looked to see 
whether liability could be imputed to the employer.53 Ruling out liability 
premised on scope of employment, or apparent authority, the Court 
examined whether an “aided-in-agency” relation standard was 
appropriate.54 This standard would apply, the Court reasoned, when 
something more than the existence of the agency relationship abetted the 
harassment, namely when a supervisor, vested with authority by the 
 49. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749. 
 50. Id. “The court found Slowik’s behavior, as described by Ellerth, severe and pervasive enough 
to create a hostile work environment, but found Burlington neither knew nor should have known about 
the conduct.” Id.; see Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 51. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749; see Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). The opinion consolidated two cases, Jensen v. Packing Corp. and Ellerth, because the 
“similarity of the issues ha[d] persuaded [the judges] to treat the cases together.” Id. at 492. Justice 
Kennedy observed the inability of the Seventh Circuit to find a single deciding rationale and 
commented that “Congress has left it to the courts to determine controlling agency law principles in a 
new and difficult area of federal law.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. This Note proposes that Congress 
regain control in this area of federal law originally created by statute. See infra Part IV. 
 52. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) states: “A master is subject to liability 
for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.” Id. However, 
“[t]he general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of 
employment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. The Court also referenced § 219(2) of the Restatement as the 
basis of its opinion: 
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of 
their employment, unless: (a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the 
master was negligent or reckless, or (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the 
master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was 
reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of 
the agency relation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958). The Court decided that subsection (b) was 
inappropriate because the issue was whether strict liability is the appropriate standard. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 758–59. The first clause of subsection (d) was also found inappropriate because the harassing 
employee is typically not exercising apparent authority; supervisors have actual power to affect the 
employment terms of their subordinates. Id. at 759. 
 54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958). The Court recognized that 
“most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accomplishing their tortious objective by the existence of the 
agency relation.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. This, the Court opined, would provide too broad a scope of 
employer liability, as any harassment on the job, whether perpetrated by co-workers or supervisors, 
would cognize liability, a result no court or the EEOC has ever endorsed. Id. 
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employer, “takes a tangible employment action against the subordinate.”55 
Justice Kennedy briefly defined tangible employment action as an action 
that would cause “a significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”56 It 
is important to note that although Ellerth pled that she had been 
constructively discharged, this allegation was not before the Supreme 
Court, so Justice Kennedy’s failure to include this in his definition is not 
dispositive.57 
The Court balanced its holding that strict vicarious liability would be 
appropriate when a tangible employment action had occurred by 
developing an affirmative defense for employers when no tangible 
employment action had occurred.58 This defense incorporates the agency 
principles described above59 and furthers Title VII’s purpose by 
encouraging employers to develop policies to prevent workplace 
harassment and encouraging employees to utilize the procedures provided 
by these policies when subjected to workplace harassment.60  
In light of the confusion that followed Ellerth and Faragher, Justice 
Thomas proved prescient with his prediction that the Court had confused 
the issue more than it answered the questions it granted certiorari to 
 55. Id.; see Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70–71 (1986) (“courts have 
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory 
personnel, whether or not the employer knew, or should have known, or approved of the supervisor 
actions.”). This result is logical because supervisors are necessarily vested with some additional 
authority before they can discharge workers, or more broadly, before they can economically affect the 
terms of their subordinate’s employment. This is precisely why an “aided-in-agency” relationship is 
the appropriate one to use. 
 56. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. Justice Kennedy’s use of the phrase “such as” denotes the list may 
not be exclusive. Arguments have been made that this list was merely suggestive of situations that 
would meet the standard of tangible employment action. See, e.g., Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 456 
(3d Cir. 2003) (“[t]he Supreme Court made it clear that it intended to provide a non-exclusive list of 
clear cases of tangible employment actions, on the one hand, and broader categories on the other”); Jin 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (“the definition given [of tangible employment 
action] by the Supreme Court [in Ellerth] is non-exclusive”); Vasquez v. Atrium Door and Window 
Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1142 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“the Supreme Court’s list of tangible employment 
actions in Ellerth was likely not intended to be either exhaustive or exclusive of constructive 
discharge”); Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1175 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (finding that the 
“Supreme Court simply provided a non-exhaustive list of incidents that would constitute a ‘tangible 
employment action’”). 
 57. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 58. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see supra notes 40–42. 
 59. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. 
 60. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (using nearly identical language 
in the rationale for supporting this affirmative defense); see supra note 36. Title VII was originally 
passed primarily to influence employers not to discriminate, rather than to provide compensation for 
employees who had been discriminated against. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; see also supra note 38. 
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resolve.61 At least with regard to constructive discharge, the Court failed to 
“derive manageable standards to govern employer liability for hostile 
environment harassment perpetrated by supervisory employees.”62 
B. Constructive Discharge was not Considered a Tangible Employment 
Action in the Second or Sixth Circuits 
One of the first federal appellate courts to squarely address the issue of 
whether constructive discharge fell into the tangible employment action 
framework was the Second Circuit in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter 
R.R.63 Caridad combined two Title VII claims: one of racial 
discrimination and one of sexual harassment.64 The plaintiff, Veronica 
Caridad, was the only female electrician working on a shift with twelve 
men.65 She alleged that her male supervisor repeatedly harassed her, and 
that other male employees treated her with hostility.66 Eventually, Caridad 
resigned after an admittedly half-hearted attempt to pursue assistance 
through the proper channels at Metro-North.67 
 61. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 774 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[a]ll in all, today’s decision is an ironic 
result for a case that generated eight different opinions in the Court of Appeals on a fundamental 
question, and in which we granted certiorari ‘to assist in defining the relevant standards of employer 
liability’”). 
 62. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 785. The best attempt to more clearly define the scope of tangible 
employment action came a year later when the EEOC published guidelines as to what it believed 
Ellerth and Faragher meant:  
Any employment action qualifies as “tangible” if it results in a significant change in 
employment status. For example, significantly changing an individual’s duties in his or her 
existing job constitutes a tangible employment action regardless of whether the individual 
retains the same salary and benefits. Similarly, altering an individual’s duties in a way that 
blocks his or her opportunity for promotion or salary increases also constitutes a tangible 
employment action. 
THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS 
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, (Notice 915.002 June 18, 
1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
 63. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 64. The racial discrimination claim was brought as a class action, and much of the opinion dealt 
with whether or not the class should be certified pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Id. 
at 286. The sexual harassment claim brought by Veronica Caridad addressed the constructive 
discharge/tangible employment action issue. Id. 
 65. Id. at 290. 
 66. Id. This harassment included unwanted sexual touchings by her supervisor, and Caridad later 
testified that “she found it difficult to do her job because she ‘didn’t know when [her supervisor] was 
going to do this,’ and ‘every day [she felt she] could be subject’ to another attack.” Id. 
 67. Id. Caridad had made complaints to the Director of Affirmative Action at Metro-North, but 
refused to supply specifics about her harassment, fearing investigation and possible further reprisal. Id. 
Additionally, Caridad testified, “she did not trust Metro-North or its equal employment office.” Id. 
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The Second Circuit relied heavily on language in Ellerth and Faragher 
in holding that constructive discharge did not constitute a tangible 
employment action.68 This decision was partially based on the fact that co-
workers, in addition to supervisors, can be responsible for a constructive 
discharge, which the court thought made it inappropriate to impose 
liability on the employer without the intervening authority of a 
supervisor.69 The court also noted that a constructive discharge is not 
ratified by the employer in the manner that other tangible employment 
actions are.70 The final premise for the court’s conclusion was that the 
plaintiff in Ellerth had pled constructive discharge, and thus constructive 
discharge is not a tangible employment action.71 
Following Caridad, after several district courts adopted its holding,72 
the Sixth Circuit tackled the issue in Turner v. Dowbrands Inc.73 Renea 
 68. Id. at 294 (“constructive discharge does not constitute a ‘tangible employment action’ as that 
term is used in Ellerth and Faragher”). 
 69. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294. The court explained: 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could 
not have been inflicted absent the agency relation . . . . As a general proposition, only a 
supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of 
injury. A co-worker can break a co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who 
has regular contact with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive 
conduct. But one co-worker . . . cannot dock another’s pay, nor can one co-worker demote 
another . . . . The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent 
to make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control. 
Id. This conclusion misstates the issue by omitting critical language from Ellerth. See infra note 104. 
 70. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294 (“unlike demotion, discharge, or similar economic sanctions, an 
employee’s constructive discharge is not ratified or approved by the employer”). No further detail was 
given to support this proposition, so it is unclear why an employer’s filing of termination papers differs 
from an employer’s filing of resignation papers when the cause of the discharge is a supervisor aided 
by his agency relationship in either firing or constructively discharging a subordinate. 
 71. Id. At the appellate level, the plaintiff in Ellerth attempted to fit her situation within the quid 
pro quo doctrine. Jansen v. Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997). In Jansen, with eight 
separate opinions: 
All the judges except Judges Easterbrook, Rovner, and Wood believe that the hostile-
environment claim was expressly waived by Ellerth in her briefs to the panel and that the 
dismissal of this claim should therefore be affirmed. All the judges except Chief Judge Posner 
and Judges Coffey and Manion believe that Ellerth’s evidence of quid pro quo harassment 
was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment, 
although the routes to this conclusion are different. 
Id. This conclusion is also faulty, as the Supreme Court left the door open as to whether Ellerth might 
amend her complaint on remand to the district court. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 766; see also infra note 105 
and accompanying text. 
 72. See Scott v. Ameritex Yarn, 72 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D.S.C. 1999) (“constructive discharge 
is not a ‘tangible employment action,’ as that term is used in Ellerth and Faragher, because it is not an 
action made with the authority or approval of the employer); Alberter v. McDonald’s Corp., 70 F. 
Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (D. Nev. 1999) (“[c]onstructive discharge is not an official act of the enterprise”); 
Desmarteau v. City of Wichita, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079 (D. Kan. 1999) (noting that even though the 
Ellerth plaintiff had pled constructive discharge, the Supreme Court failed to include constructive 
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Turner’s action under Title VII alleged that her supervisor, Thomas 
Morrissey, “subjected her to sexually explicit gestures, remarks, innuendos 
and comments.”74 The Sixth Circuit panel affirmed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment to Dowbrands, and relying blindly on 
Caridad, disregarded Turner’s claim that constructive discharge was a 
tangible employment action.75 
C. Constructive Discharge Might Have Been a Tangible Employment 
Action in the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits 
In Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc.,76 the First Circuit declined 
to follow the approach laid out by the Second and Sixth Circuits. The 
plaintiff, Bobbi-Lyn Reed, worked as a telemarketer for MBNA under the 
supervision of William Appel during two separate periods of 
employment.77 Reed’s complaint alleged that Appel seriously abused and 
harassed her78 during both periods of employment, and alleged her first 
resignation was a constructive discharge.79 The district court granted 
MBNA’s motion for summary judgment under the Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense.80 
The First Circuit reversed, concluding that the decisions in Caridad 
and Turner ignored the real issue.81 While leaning toward the holdings of 
discharge in its definition of tangible employment action); Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 
1019 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (“[t]he Faragher court does not mention constructive discharge as a tangible 
employment action. If it had desired, the Supreme Court could have easily listed ‘constructive 
discharge’ along with the other incidents as constituting a tangible employment action”). 
 73. No. 99-3984, 2000 WL 924599 (6th Cir. June 26, 2000). 
 74. Id. at *1. 
 75. Id. at *2. “Turner’s claim of constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action for 
purposes of Faragher and [Ellerth]. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R.” Id. 
 76. 333 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 77. Id. at 30. Reed worked from June 1999, until the fall of 1999 when she quit because of 
Appel’s harassment, but returned in May 2000 because she needed the higher wages available at 
MBNA. Id. at 30–31. Her second tenure lasted for just over a year; Reed quit a second time in June 
2001. Id. at 31. 
 78. Id. at 30–31. “Appel frequently dropped green M&M’s on Reed’s desk claiming that they 
would ‘make [her] horny.’” Id. at 30. After an evening where Reed was babysitting Appel’s two-year-
old son, before Reed could leave Appel’s house, he “put his arm around her neck and dragged her into 
the living room where he pressed her to perform oral sex on him.” Id. Reed quit in light of these 
events, scared to tell anyone in light of Appel’s warnings that his family had influence with the 
company and that they would both be fired if she told anyone what happened. Id. at 31. 
 79. Id. at 33. Fortunately, Reed was able to convince MBNA to initiate an investigation into 
Appel’s behavior that resulted in his swift resignation before MBNA had completed the paperwork to 
fire him. Id. at 31. 
 80. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 363, 376 (D. Me. 2002). 
 81. Reed, 333 F.3d at 33. “Because the conduct differs from case to case, we see no reason to 
adopt a blanket rule one way or the other.” Id. The court decided that rather than weighing in on this 
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the Second and Sixth Circuits, Reed left the door open to the possibility 
that constructive discharge, under an appropriate set of facts, might qualify 
as a tangible employment action.82 However, the court in Reed decided 
that because Appel’s actions were increasingly unofficial, this was the 
type of case for which the Ellerth/Faragher defense was intended.83 
The Seventh Circuit also followed the course set down in Reed, though 
it ruled in Robinson v. Sappington84 that the constructive discharge in that 
case was a tangible employment action.85 In Robinson, the plaintiff was a 
judicial secretary and clerk for a state judge in Macon County, Illinois and 
her harasser was the judge.86 Robinson did not allege that Judge 
Sappington directly propositioned her but rather that he repeatedly 
harassed her about her looks, her dating habits, and on two occasions, 
threatened her life.87 The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the defendants on all counts.88 
issue, the real question to be decided was whether a supervisor should be treated as acting for the 
employer. Id. The court concluded that this should be the case when there is an official action taken 
against the employee. Id. In one sense, this returns this area of the law to pre-Ellerth notions of agency 
and scope of employment. Of course, Appel’s actions were outside the scope of his employment; 
almost all harassment is outside the scope of employment. See id. The court concluded that because 
Appel’s behavior was outside the scope of employment, “[it was] exactly the kind of wholly 
unauthorized conduct for which the affirmative defense was designed.” Id. 
 The court’s comment that “Appel’s supervisory status may have facilitated his harassment, but 
that is a reason for vicarious liability, not for bypassing the affirmative defense” misses the purpose for 
which the Supreme Court applied the “aided-in-agency” doctrine in Ellerth. Id. 
 82. Id. “Nothing is gained by arguing in the abstract about whether constructive discharge is or is 
not a discharge; for some purposes or rubrics, it might be so treated.” Id. Again, this ignores the fact 
that doctrines in various federal employment discrimination statutes are treated similarly for a reason, 
to help the courts make consistent judgments and to apply the laws in a uniform manner. 
 On the other hand, perhaps this result is not so odd considering that a district court in 
Pennsylvania concluded that the question whether constructive discharge was a tangible employment 
action was best left to juries. See Hawk v. Americold Logistics, LLC, No. 02-3528, 2003 WL 929221, 
at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2003) (“the existence or nonexistence of a tangible employment action is an 
issue of fact for the jury”). 
 83. Reed, 333 F.3d at 33; see also Recent Cases, Employment Law—Vicarious Liability—First 
Circuit Holds That Classification of Constructive Discharge as a Tangible Employment Action Should 
be Left to Case-by-Case Determination—Reed v. MBNA Marketing Systems, Inc., 333 F.3d 27 (1st 
Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1007 (2004) (recognizing that although the First Circuit leaves 
the door open to the possibility that constructive discharge claims might be tangible employment 
actions, in reality, its result is a tacit endorsement of those courts that have held it is not). Because 
Reed stated that “possibly, on rare facts” a claim of constructive discharge might negate the 
affirmative defense, the leaning of the opinion is apparent. See Reed, 333 F.3d at 33. 
 84. 351 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 85. Id. at 336. “[W]e believe a constructive discharge may be considered a tangible employment 
action.” Id. The court did not explicitly resolve the issue, as the Second Circuit did in Caridad, but yet 
relied heavily on the rationale in Caridad to support its conclusion. Id. at 334–36. 
 86. Id. at 320. 
 87. Id. at 320–24. At one point, in Judge Sappington’s chambers, 
Robinson testified that “[Judge Sappington] brought my face up so that I made eye contact, 
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On the narrow question of whether Robinson’s constructive discharge 
satisfied Ellerth/Faragher in order to qualify as a tangible employment 
action, the Seventh Circuit approved of both the First Circuit’s decision in 
Reed89 and the Second Circuit’s decision in Caridad.90 Ultimately, the 
court held that “in circumstances where ‘official actions by the supervisor 
. . . make employment intolerable,’ we believe a constructive discharge 
may be considered a tangible employment action.”91  
Although the issue has come tangentially before the Ninth Circuit, it 
specifically declined to decide whether constructive discharge is a tangible 
employment action.92 
and he told me that he wanted me to look into his eyes so that I fully understood what he was 
saying . . . . He told me if he ever found out I was shacking up with anybody, he would kill 
me.” 
Id. at 321. On another occasion, Robinson’s testimony related: 
Judge Sappington summoned Ms. Robinson and an assistant state’s attorney to his courtroom. 
Judge Sappington asked the state’s attorney to recount the facts of a grisly murder in which a 
woman was shot, dismembered and decapitated. After the state’s attorney left the room, Ms. 
Robinson, who was “very tearful,” asked Judge Sappington “why he did that to me because 
there was absolutely no purpose in [the attorney] coming over there. It wasn’t as though he 
was signing a warrant or anything like that and needed any information.” Judge Sappington 
responded that Ms. Robinson was “beautiful and naive, and . . . would face a fate like [the 
victim] faced.” 
Id. at 322 (internal citations omitted). 
 88. Id. at 328. 
 89. See supra note 76. 
 90. See supra note 63. 
 91. Robinson, 351 F.3d at 336 (citing Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 
2003)). While this sounds like a middle of the road solution, the rationale it is based on is as biased as 
that in Reed. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 The Seventh Circuit noted several extraneous circumstances unique to the case that pushed the 
constructive discharge over the line into a tangible employment action. Id. at 337. Robinson’s 
resignation, in part, was effected by a suggestion from the presiding judge of the jurisdiction. Id. This 
suggestion came after a transfer of Robinson to a different judge, and these actions were only possible 
because the presiding judge “ha[d] been empowered by the [employer] . . . to make economic 
decisions affecting other employees under his or her control.” Id. at 335 (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 
294). The court held that these actions by the presiding judge could lead a jury to determine that the 
resignation resulted in part from these actions in addition to the harassment by Judge Sappington. Id. at 
331. 
 92. See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1179 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[w]e have not yet 
determined whether a constructive discharge is a tangible employment action . . . [and we] do not 
reach [the] issue in this case because Kohler has waived her constructive discharge claim”); Montero 
v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 1999) (“we need not decide whether a constructive 
discharge can be a ‘tangible employment action’ for the purpose of a Faragher analysis, because [the] 
Plaintiff was not constructively discharged”). 
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D. Constructive Discharge Was a Tangible Employment Action in the 
Third and Eighth Circuits 
The Eighth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to consider 
constructive discharge a tangible employment action when it decided 
Philips v. Taco Bell, Inc.93 The Philips plaintiff, however, was not 
constructively discharged, so resolution of the tangible employment action 
question was not necessary to the holding.94 That dictum was affirmed by 
the Eighth Circuit three years later in Jackson v. Arkansas Dep’t of 
Vocational and Technical Educ. Div.95 The Jackson opinion, however, had 
no independent rationale supporting the proposition that a constructive 
discharge was a tangible employment action.96 The Eighth Circuit 
affirmed this ruling two years later, again without providing an 
independent rationale.97 
While the Eighth Circuit did not provide any meaningful rationale to 
support its conclusions in these three cases, a district court within the 
Eighth Circuit did publish an opinion substantially discussing the issue in 
June 2000.98 Cherry v. Menard, Inc.99 involved a claim by an African-
American woman that her employer violated Title VII by both racially and 
sexually discriminating against her.100 This discrimination ultimately 
 93. 156 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 94. Id. at 889 n.6. “As we explain . . . Philips was not constructively discharged, nor did she 
suffer any other tangible detrimental employment action.” Id. (emphasis added). This language 
strongly suggests that the Eighth Circuit implicitly recognized, even at this early date, that constructive 
discharge is a tangible employment action by its mere inclusion in a sentence noting that Philips did 
not suffer a tangible employment action. 
 95. 272 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 96. Id. at 1026. The court cited language from Ellerth recognizing that a tangible employment 
action includes such actions as “discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. (quoting 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765). This holding is not central to the decision in the case, however, because the 
court found that Jackson was not constructively discharged, and allowed the employer to assert the 
affirmative defense. Jackson, 272 F.3d at 1027. 
 97. See Jaros v. LodgeNet Entm’t Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2003) (“constructive 
discharge constitutes a tangible employment action which prevents an employer from utilizing the 
[Ellerth/Faragher] affirmative defense”). 
 98. Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2000). This case was decided after 
Phillips but before Jackson and Jaros, perhaps explaining, in part, why the Eighth Circuit did not re-
cover this ground, thinking the matter had been conclusively settled, though of course Cherry is not 
binding on the other courts in the Eighth Circuit. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1164. The abuse that Cherry alleged she suffered was severe, ranging from remarks by 
her supervisor that “he had [sex with] black women before, and further explaining what he did with 
these [sic] women sexually.” Id. at 1165. The racial abuse was just as severe, as Cherry endured 
“several months of constant degrading comments about minorities.” Id. The final straw that led to 
Cherry’s resignation was when she overheard an assistant manager deny a discount to an Asian 
customer because the manager said, “I hate those gooks.” Id. at 1166. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/12
p1621 Weiss book pages.doc6/21/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] HOW SUDERS COMPLICATES TITLE VII LAWSUITS 1635 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resulted in Cherry’s resignation, which she claimed was a constructive 
discharge.101 
The district court dissected the Caridad opinion to support its 
conclusion that constructive discharge is a tangible employment action and 
that Menard could not utilize the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.102 
The district court first concluded that an issue of tangible employment 
action would not arise unless the harassing party is a supervisor, finding 
irrelevant that co-workers can cause a constructive discharge.103 This led 
to the court’s disagreement with Caridad’s reasoning, because of its focus 
on the distinction between co-workers and supervisors.104 The court also 
dispensed with Caridad’s claim that because the employer does not ratify 
constructive discharges, they cannot qualify as tangible employment 
actions by noting that all discharges are ratified in some sense.105 Finally, 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1171–77. This was probably because Menard relied strongly on Caridad in its brief, 
and Caridad was, at the time, the only Court of Appeals case with any supporting rationale on the 
issue. See id. at 1171. 
 103. Id. The court draws this inference directly from Ellerth, because the entire aided-in-agency 
relation discussion in Ellerth is premised on the notion that a supervisor is the harassing party. Id.; see 
also Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 759. Moreover, as Justice Souter recognized in Faragher, “supervisors have 
special authority enhancing their capacity to harass, and that the employer can guard against their 
misbehavior more easily because their numbers are by definition fewer than the numbers of regular 
employees.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 800–01. 
 104. Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73. Ellerth instructs that tangible employment actions 
constitute “significant change[s] in employment status” coupled with inflictions of “direct economic 
harm.” Id. at 1172 (citing Ellerth, 542 U.S. at 761–62). By looking at the pertinent text from Ellerth, 
the Cherry court points out where Caridad went wrong. The Caridad opinion omitted particular 
phrases and words when it cited Ellerth: 
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance the injury could 
not have been inflicted absent the agency relation. A tangible employment action in most 
cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor, or other 
person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this sort of injury. A co-worker 
can break a co-worker’s arm as easily as a supervisor, and anyone who has regular contact 
with an employee can inflict psychological injuries by his or her offensive conduct . . . . But 
one co-worker (absent some elaborate scheme) cannot dock another’s pay, nor can one co-
worker demote another. Tangible employment actions fall within the special province of the 
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a distinct class of agent to 
make economic decisions affecting other employees under his or her control. [Ellerth, 524 
U.S. at 761–62, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (emphasis indicating portions deleted from the quotation of 
this paragraph in Caridad, 191 F.3d at 294).]. 
Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1172. The point, then, is that while Caridad reasons that a tangible 
employment action must be an action that only supervisors can inflict, the question that remains is 
whether or not the proper standard of harm has been inflicted. Id. at 1172–73. This question argues 
against the Supreme Court’s new standards. See infra Part III.A. 
 105. Id. at 1173–74. To rebut this argument, the Cherry court looked at prior case law interpreting 
constructive discharge to see whether or not ratification by the employer was present. Id. at 1174. This 
search concluded that “a constructive discharge resulting from a supervisor’s conduct is, legally, the 
employer’s own ‘deliberate act.’” Id.; see also Spears v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 210 F.3d 850, 854 (8th 
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the court disagreed with Caridad’s claim that this issue was decided in 
Ellerth, because constructive discharge was not directly before the 
Supreme Court in Ellerth.106 For these reasons, the district court held that 
Cherry’s claim of constructive discharge could go forward and that 
Menard could not raise the Ellerth/Faragher defense.107 
The first thorough analysis at the circuit court level resulting in a 
holding that constructive discharge was a tangible employment action 
occurred in the Third Circuit in 2003.108 Nancy Drew Suders, the plaintiff 
in this case, was a Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) officer who began 
work in March 1998.109 From the beginning of her employment, Suders 
alleged she suffered severe harassment, and she eventually resigned in 
August 1998.110 The final straw was an apparent set-up where the officers 
framed Suders for “stealing” her own computer skills test results, 
handcuffed her, and treated her as a suspect until she finally convinced the 
officers she really intended to resign.111 Suders filed suit in the Middle 
Cir. 2000); Philips v. Taco Bell, 156 F.3d 884, 890 (8th Cir. 1998); Bergstrom-Ek v. Best Oil Co., 153 
F.3d 851, 858 (8th Cir. 1998); Knowles v. Citicorp Mortgage, 142 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1998). 
Judge Posner addressed the same issue in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion below Ellerth. Jansen v. 
Packaging Corp., 123 F.3d 490, 515 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge 
Posner concluded “[constructive] termination will look to the supervisor’s superiors like a voluntary 
quit. But since there is always some paperwork involved in an employee’s quitting, the higher-ups in 
the company will have some ability to monitor constructive discharges, and I would therefore impose 
strict liability in such cases.” Id. 
 106. Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. The issue of whether or not the Ellerth plaintiff had 
suffered a constructive discharge was pled, but not considered by the Supreme Court in that case. Id. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court specifically noted in Ellerth that “[i]n the context of this case, a 
tangible employment action would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a promotion.” Ellerth, 
542 U.S. at 761 (emphasis added). 
 107. Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1175 (“this court concludes that, contrary to the conclusion in 
Caridad, a constructive discharge resulting from sexually harassing conduct of a supervisor does 
constitute a ‘tangible employment action’ within the meaning of the Ellerth/Faragher standard, and 
therefore would deprive an employer of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to vicarious 
liability”). 
 108. Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 109. Id. at 436. Suders had previously worked for ten years in law enforcement in Fulton County, 
Pennsylvania, when she was urged to apply for a position with the State police force. Id. at 435–36. 
Her application was accepted, and she began her employment with the State police as a “police 
communications operator.” Id. at 436. 
 110. Id. The perpetrators of this harassment were three officers in the barracks where she worked, 
including Station Commander Sergeant Eric Easton, Patrol Corporal William Baker, and Corporal Eric 
Prendergast. Id. The harassment varied in degree, but Suders alleged, inter alia, that “every time she 
would go into Easton’s office, ‘he would bring up [the subject of] people having sex with animals. . . . 
[T]hat’s all the man wanted to talk about.’” Id. Suders’ main complaint against Baker was that as many 
as ten times a night, he would “cross his hands, grab hold of his private parts and yell, suck it. The man 
did this, and he would beat on [his crotch] . . . . All he wanted to do was play with his crotch.” Id. at 
437. 
 111. Id. at 439. She had been carrying a written resignation with her, and even after tendering it, 
she was not permitted to leave because she was a ‘suspect’ in the alleged ‘theft.’ Id. These final events 
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District of Pennsylvania, where the PSP’s motion for summary judgment 
was granted in full.112 She appealed to the Third Circuit.113 
The Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that constructive 
discharge was a tangible employment action.114 In contrast to the Eighth 
Circuit’s cursory dispositions of this issue,115 Judge Fuentes undertook a 
searching review of the case law and principles reviewed in Ellerth and 
Faragher and the intervening five-year period.116 The discussion began by 
affirming the principle that only when a supervisor is responsible for the 
harassment is the “aided-in-agency” standard appropriate to impute 
liability to the employer.117 The key principle from Ellerth and Faragher 
is that tangible employment actions “implicate, in some meaningful way, 
the authority of the employer itself.”118 While the behavior of Suders’ 
fellow officers, Easton, Baker, and Prendergrast, was certainly not 
endorsed by the PSP and these individuals had no authority to demote or 
fire Suders, the court refused “to rein in the scope of a supervisor within 
the meaning of Ellerth and Faragher”119 because they were all superiors to 
Suders.120 
After discussing the position of various courts on the issue, the Third 
Circuit firmly sided with the Eighth Circuit in holding that constructive 
may have qualified as an official act under the new Suders framework. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2357 
n.11 (2004); see infra Part II.E. 
 112. Id. at 439–40. The district court agreed that Suders had raised a viable hostile work 
environment claim, but concluded that the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense applied, and 
foreclosed her claim when they found the defense was asserted successfully. Id. at 440. This was in 
spite of the fact that Suders had sought the assistance in June of Virginia Smith-Elliott, who was an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for the State Police. Id. at 438. In August, Suders went back to 
Smith-Elliott for help, but alleged Smith-Elliott was insensitive and unhelpful. Id. 
 113. Id. at 440. 
 114. Id. at 461–62. 
 115. See, e.g., supra notes 93–97. 
 116. Suders, 325 F.3d at 447–62. Judge Fuentes noted particularly that the district court had 
allowed the defendants to assert the affirmative defense without analysis, and that “the District Court 
[seemed to have] bypassed the critical issue in this case.” Id. at 447. 
 117. Id. at 450. The distinction between co-workers and supervisors is critical, because only 
supervisors are imbued with authority vested in them by the employer. See supra note 42. 
 118. Suders, 325 F.3d at 451. The court recognized some limitation on this, and was careful to use 
words such as ‘often’ and ‘in most cases’ to describe the amount of involvement of the enterprise 
necessary to find vicarious liability. See id. 
 119. Id. at 450 n.11. 
 120. Id. The court approvingly cited Susan Estrich, who claimed that while “the supervisor may 
have been specifically delegated the power to hire and fire, . . . he is also delegated the power to define 
the acceptable working conditions of the workplace.” Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
813, 855 (1991); see also infra note 155. 
 The record noted that “Easton was responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the 
McConnellsburg barracks; and . . . both Baker and Prendergast had supervisory duties with respect to 
‘running their shifts.’” Suders, 325 F.3d at 450 n.11. 
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discharge is a tangible employment action.121 Judge Fuentes considered 
the holding in Cherry v. Menard, Inc.122 and noted that it “presented a 
compelling counterpoint to the Second Circuit’s decision in Caridad.”123 
Also cited approvingly was an Arizona District Court case which followed 
the Eighth Circuit,124 as well as two unpublished district court opinions, 
one from Oregon, and one from Texas, which arrived at the same result.125 
Also providing support to the Third Circuit’s ruling were two previous 
cases it decided that shed light on the definition of tangible employment 
action.126 In Cardenas v. Massey,127 the Third Circuit ducked the issue of 
whether a constructive discharge was a tangible employment action, 
leaving this decision to the District Court, though “[f]or the purposes of 
 121. Id. at 454. This holding was based on three observations: 
(1) although we have not definitively ruled on the issue, our recent decisions have suggested 
that a constructive discharge constitutes a tangible employment action; (2) none of the 
grounds advanced by the Caridad line of cases persuades us that a constructive discharge 
should not be held to constitute a tangible employment action; and (3) holding an employer 
strictly liable for a constructive discharge resulting from the actionable harassment of its 
supervisors more faithfully adheres to the policy objectives set forth in Ellerth and Faragher 
and to our own Title VII jurisprudence. 
Id. 
 122. 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
 123. Suders, 325 F.3d at 454. The Cherry court noted that of the reasons cited in Caridad 
supporting the contention that constructive discharge is not a tangible employment action, “none . . . 
stands up to a probing scrutiny.” Cherry, 101 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. See supra notes 98–103 and 
accompanying text. 
 124. Suders, 325 F.3d at 454. See Vasquez v. Atrium Door & Window Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 
1142 (D. Ariz. 2002). The Vasquez court listed three factors in support of the Eighth Circuit’s 
conclusion that constructive discharge was a tangible employment action: 
(1) the Ellerth/Faragher list of tangible employment actions was not intended to be 
exhaustive; (2) the majority’s view that a constructive discharge is a tangible employment 
action is more consistent with the remedial purposes of Title VII; and (3) the economic 
damage to the employee is the same regardless of whether he or she is unlawfully fired or 
constructively discharged. 
Id. In Vasquez, the court did not note any difference in constructive discharges brought as claims under 
separate provisions of federal law. Id. See EEOC v. Univ. of Chi. Hosp., 276 F.3d 326, 331 (7th Cir. 
2002) (holding constructive discharge is an adverse employment action in the context of religious 
discrimination); Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 554 (11th Cir. 1997) (pre-
dating Ellerth and holding constructive discharge is an adverse employment action under an ADEA 
claim); see also infra note 144 (analogizing Title VII and the ADEA). 
 125. See Haworth v. Romania Imported Motors, Inc., No. CV 00-1721-HA, 2001 WL 34041893, 
at *8 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2001) (including dicta that “if there were a factual determination that plaintiff 
was constructively discharged, defendant would be precluded from asserting the Ellerth/Faragher 
affirmative defense”); Taylor v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., Inc., No. CIV. A. 700CV145-R, 2001 
WL 1012803, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2001) (including dicta that constructive discharge would be a 
tangible employment action, but that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence that he was 
constructively discharged). 
 126. Suders, 325 F.3d at 455–56. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001); Durham 
Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 127. 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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[that] discussion, [it] assume[d] [that] a constructive discharge [was] a 
tangible employment action.”128 Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans129 was 
clear in its agreement that constructive discharge was a tangible 
employment action, but resolution of that issue was unnecessary to the 
outcome of the case because the plaintiff had alleged other tangible 
employment actions.130  
The Third Circuit continued by systematically attacking the reasoning 
of cases holding to the contrary, mainly by rebutting claims made in 
Caridad.131 Judge Fuentes first agreed with the Cherry court that the list of 
tangible employment actions in Ellerth was not intended to be 
exclusive.132 Next, the court dispensed with the claim that Ellerth itself 
settled the issue, noting that a constructive discharge claim was not before 
the court in that case.133 Finally, the court noted that the claim that the 
employer does not ratify constructive discharges misses the point that 
employers are officially notified of employees who quit just as they are of 
employees who are terminated.134 
E. Constructive Discharge Might be a Tangible Employment Action: The 
Supreme Court Weighs In 
The PSP appealed the Third Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.135 The Court’s intention to avoid answering the question 
presented136 with a yes or no was clearly evident at oral argument.137 The 
 128. Id. at 267 n.10. 
 129. 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 130. Id. at 150 n.5 (“[i]n a case such as this one, where . . . Evans was constructively discharged 
by her supervisors’ action after their own actionable behavior, the holdings and instruction of Ellerth 
and Faragher are clear: the employer, Durham Life Insurance Company, is automatically liable and no 
affirmative defense is available”). 
 131. Suders, 325 F.3d at 456–61.  
 132. Id. at 456. The court noted that the list employed a structural technique beginning with 
specifics and ending with generalities that supported this proposition. See id. Also, the court looked 
back to its own decision in Durham Life where it found three disparate examples of activity that 
qualified as a tangible employment action, namely, “where a supervisor (1) dismissed an employee’s 
secretary, (2) removed her essential work files, and (3) allocated to her a disproportionate share of less 
lucrative assignments.” Durham Life, 166 F.3d at 153–54. 
 133. Suders, 325 F.3d at 456–57. See supra note 102. 
 134. Suders, 325 F.3d at 458–60. See supra note 101. 
 135. 540 U.S. 1046 (2003). 
 136. See supra note 13. 
 137. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 
2342 (2004) (No. 03-95 Mar. 31, 2004), available at 2004 WL 772081 [hereinafter Suders Oral 
Argument]. Justice O’Connor asked the first question to the Pennsylvania State Police’s counsel, and 
suggested that “I don’t know that viewing it through the lens of a constructive discharge is helpful.” Id. 
at *4. Justice Scalia agreed. See id. at *5.  
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final opinion makes it clear that although the Court believed it was helping 
to inform Title VII jurisprudence by clarifying the questions which cases 
like Suders’ present, it had no interest in drawing a bright-line rule with 
respect to constructive discharges.138 
Instead, the bright-line rule it purported to draw causes even more 
confusion. In introducing its analysis, the Court stated: “an employer does 
not have recourse to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense when a 
supervisor’s official act precipitates the constructive discharge; absent 
such a ‘tangible employment action,’ however, the defense is available to 
the employer whose supervisors are charged with harassment.”139 Justice 
Ginsburg began by recognizing that, as presented, the question was which 
of two categories a constructive discharge falls into.140 The Court’s 
exploration then proceeded to examine Ellerth and Faragher’s 
rationales.141 The Court then viewed the intersection of Suders’ original 
sexual harassment claim with her claim of constructive discharge.142 
The recognition that constructive discharge is, in one sense, simply a 
more severe hostile work environment claim allowed the Court to examine 
what sources could potentially be responsible for a constructive 
discharge.143 These sources are: “co-worker conduct, unofficial 
 The overall tenor of the argument made it clear that the Court did not intend to simply answer the 
question presented with a simple yes or no. I was present in the courtroom for the argument in this 
case on March 31, 2004 and could tell immediately that the Justices were not satisfied with a straight 
yes or no answer, although exactly how they would resolve the case was unclear. Comparing the 
decision to the tone and questions of the individual justices at oral argument, it is my personal 
conclusion that a compromise was reached between Justices who were concerned with holding an 
employer liable for something that its higher-ups were unaware of and Justices who might have been 
willing to endorse the approach I lay out in Part IV, infra. The fact that eight of the nine Justices 
signed Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is also somewhat telling. 
 138. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355–56 (noting that this is exactly what the Third Circuit had done 
and attacking this as misplaced).  
 139. See id. at 2351. This begs the question. As Part III demonstrates, the use of the phrase 
“official act” leaves district courts fumbling for guidance. See infra Part III. 
 140. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352 (asking “[i]nto which Ellerth/Faragher category do hostile-
environment constructive discharge claims fall.”). 
 141. See id. at 2352–54. Of note in this discussion is the Court’s tacit acknowledgement that the 
creation of this affirmative defense was an attempt to “advance Congress’ purpose ‘to promote 
conciliation rather than litigation’ of Title VII controversies.” Id. at 2353 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
764). As explained in Part IV, infra, Congress is the body best situated to determine what procedures 
promote conciliation rather than litigation. See infra Part IV. 
 142. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2354. The logic here is that a run-of-the-mill Title VII hostile work 
environment claim is the same type of complaint as a constructive discharge, only that the constructive 
discharge claim requires “something more.” Id.  
 143. Of course this analysis transforms constructive discharge from an analysis about the holistic 
intolerability of working conditions into one that may be more focused on individual events and 
attempting to classify them within a rigid framework which may have large gaps between its 
categories.  
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supervisory conduct, or official company acts.”144 The first category is 
explicitly excluded from consideration by the Court.145 The final holding 
in Suders applies the Ellerth framework to the final two categories: 
harassment that qualifies as “unofficial supervisory conduct” allows an 
employer to use the affirmative defense; harassment that is somehow an 
“official company act” negates the affirmative defense’s availability.146 
The analysis leaves open the potential question of whether the harassment 
itself must be an official act, or whether liability could potentially be 
imputed to the employer after an official act which was the “last straw” 
that precipitated the employee’s resignation.147 
The Court remanded the case because genuine issues of material fact 
remained whether what Suders alleged constituted an official act of the 
PSP.148 As of mid-September 2004, the jury is still out on how courts will 
interpret the new language from Suders, but early cases suggest courts will 
have to make a far deeper inquiry than one might expect from the 
relatively simple language of Title VII.149 The Eighth Circuit gave a 
 144. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355. 
 145. No one has seriously suggested that employers should be strictly liable for the actions of non-
supervisory personnel in creating hostile work environments. See supra note 103 and accompanying 
text; see also Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2352 n.6. 
 146. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355. This is appropriate, according to Justice Ginsburg, because 
without this “official act,” whether the supervisor has been aided by the agency relationship is 
uncertain enough to make the affirmative defense proper. Id. It is worth noting, in defense of this 
argument, that an employer still retains the burden of proof with respect to the affirmative defense. See 
id. 
 147. See id. at 2355. Of course, this is the problem that constructive discharge creates; whereas a 
termination, demotion or hiring are unilateral decisions made by an employer, constructive discharge 
involves two prongs—the causal prong of unremitting abuse and the resulting prong of the unilateral 
resignation by the employee. See id.; see also infra Part III.C. 
 148. Suders, 124 at 2357 n.11. 
 149. Of course, Title VII merely prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any 
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 Instructive is a state appellate decision, which held that the following allegations did not rise to 
the level of an official act: 
She was given a heavier workload than others; she was required to maintain a daily log of her 
work and work locations; she was not invited to meetings with vendors; her office keys were 
taken when the locks were changed on the Education Center; she was not given a 
performance evaluation; and she received numerous critical, insulting e-mails from her 
supervisor. 
Barra v. Rose Tree Media School Dist., 858 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004). The court in 
Barra, after enumerating these allegations, held without explanation that none of them (or, as one 
might persuasively argue, all of them together) rose to the level of an “official act of a supervisor” as 
required by Suders. Id. at 217; see also McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 440–41 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (holding under a weak set of facts that the plaintiff could not prove constructive discharge 
and the affirmative defense applied); Luciano v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, No. Civ. A.02-10895-RGS, 
2004 WL 1922137 (D. Mass. Aug. 30, 2004) (holding that the plaintiff could not establish constructive 
discharge as a matter of law because her working conditions were not sufficiently unpleasant); Baker 
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prescient example just a month after Suders by creating its own exception 
to the affirmative defense.150 Surely, this is not the last time such an 
exception or new interpretation will occur. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Agency and Policy 
The Supreme Court was correct to focus on § 219(2)(d) of the 
Restatement of Agency (the tortfeasor “was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the existence of the agency relation”) in beginning its analysis in 
Ellerth.151 To discover which instances of harassment possess the “aided-
in-agency” relationship, prior case law offers some advice.152 There was 
wide agreement pre-Ellerth that vicarious liability was appropriate in the 
v. Boeing Helicopters, No. Civ. A. C1-3565, 2004 WL 1490358, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2004) 
(holding the affirmative defense applicable because the harassing party was not the plaintiff’s 
supervisor). 
 150. In McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004), Judge Riley’s opinion 
for the majority expressed his view that even though the employer could not prove the second prong of 
the affirmative defense, this did not matter—the employer should be able to use the defense anyway. 
Id. at 771. Judge Riley’s strong language almost brustles with the frustration that must follow 
decisions like Suders, which fail to demonstrate guidance to lower courts: “[j]udicially adopted 
defenses should not be viewed in a vacuum and blindly applied to all future cases.” Id. Instead, the 
facts of McCurdy, which involved only a single episode of harassment, apparently justify dispensing 
with the second prong, even though McCurdy did promptly report her harassment. Id. at 774. 
 Judge Melloy dissented in McCurdy, stating that although the first prong of the affirmative 
defense was met, this only “mitigate[s] damages; . . . it does not create a complete defense to liability.” 
Id. at 776. Examining the relevance of the affirmative defense’s prongs with respect to damages is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
 151. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998). “[T]he servant purported to act or to 
speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 219(2)(d) (1958) (emphasis added). The italicized language is at issue here. See supra notes 55, 104. 
The “apparent authority” language of § 219(2)(d) is not relevant to this matter because most, if not all, 
supervisors who harass subordinates are doing so not with apparent authority, but with real authority to 
impact the subordinate’s career. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219, cmt. e (1958) 
(“[t]his subsection enumerates the situations in which a master may be liable for torts of servants 
acting solely for their own purposes and hence not in the scope of employment”) (emphasis added). 
The importance of this comment is apparent, as it validates the supposition that the aided-in-agency 
standard is appropriate when supervisors engage in behavior outside the traditional scope of their 
employment, such as sexual harassment.  
 See also Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[t]he modern corporate entity 
consists of the individuals who manage it, and little, if any, progress in eradicating discrimination in 
employment will be made if the corporate employer is able to hide behind the shield of individual 
employee action”). 
 152. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. On the one hand, supervisors are aided by the agency relationship 
for the simple fact that the relationship puts them in close contact with the victim of harassment. See 
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995). However, the mere existence of close contact 
afforded by the agency relationship was not enough to impose vicarious liability pre-Ellerth. Id. at 
1397–98. 
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context of discriminatory discharges, where the supervisor was only able 
to discharge the complainant because of his or her agency relationship 
with the employer.153 This is primarily because supervisors are vested with 
the power to hire and fire which flows directly from their agency 
relationship with the employer.154 
The fact that supervisors are vested with discharge powers should not 
be confused by requiring that the use of these powers be a necessary 
component of a discrimination claim. In many cases that do not rise to the 
level of quid pro quo harassment, it is the mere presence of discharge 
authority that makes the harassment possible or makes the victim less 
likely to speak out.155 The ultimate question in a case like Suders ought to 
be “was the supervisor aided in committing the harassment by his or her 
supervisory authority?”156 The Supreme Court may have understood this to 
be the same as asking whether the constructive discharge was precipitated 
by an official act, but their focus on whether employer liability was 
appropriate suggests that they considered it more important to determine 
whether the employer could exercise control over such an act.157 In reality, 
 153. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70–71 (1986) (“the 
courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by 
supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the 
supervisor’s actions”). Meritor cited the EEOC guidelines for employer liability, 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.11(c), which were repealed in 1999 after Ellerth and Faragher. 64 Fed. Reg. 58,334 (Oct. 29, 
1999). 
 154. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (explaining that tangible employment decisions can only be 
made by supervisory personnel, in contrast to other tortious conduct, such as battery, that can be done 
by any co-worker). 
 155. Of course, the affirmative defense requires that the victim speak out, or more technically, 
requires that the employer be able to prove that the victim did not speak out. See Pa. State Police v. 
Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2354 (2004). Justice Marshall addressed this very point in Meritor: 
A supervisor’s responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire, and 
discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such actions. Rather, a supervisor is 
charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe, 
productive workplace. There is no reason why abuse of the latter authority should have 
different consequences than abuse of the former. In both cases, it is the authority vested in the 
supervisor by the employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely because the 
supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is able to impose 
unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates. 
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 76–77 (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 156. See infra note 157. 
 157. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355. Justice Ginsburg points out that “absent . . . an official act, the 
extent to which the supervisor’s misconduct has been aided by the agency relation . . . is less certain.” 
Id. This may be so, but there is no obstacle to using the constructive discharge inquiry itself to inform 
this analysis. If the high standard for constructive discharge can be shown by an employee, this should 
satisfy the need to show that a supervisor’s harassment was aided by his supervisory authority. 
 Of course, this is not to say that this is the only appropriate test that could fashioned. Because 
Suders leaves it to the district courts to determine what is and what is not an official act, the Court 
could have simply charged district courts with answering a but-for version of the question in the text: 
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attention should be focused on whether supervisory authority aided the 
harassment, regardless of what actions were taken. Supervisors are just as 
capable of using their authority to harass subordinates without taking any 
action at all beyond unspoken threats.158 
This discussion points to an important reason why Congress is best 
equipped to deal with the confusion arising in these types of cases.159 
Ultimately it is a normative judgment whether a specific employer ought 
to be liable for the misconduct of its supervisory staff. In a case like 
Reed,160 honest people can have different opinions about whether the 
employer, MBNA, ought to be responsible for the reprehensible behavior 
of its employee Mr. Appel. This is why the political branches of 
government ought to resolve this issue, rather than the independent 
judiciary.161 
B. Constructive Discharge is Still a Discharge 
On its face, the proposition that a constructive discharge and actual 
discharge damage the employee in the same manner seems clear.162 A 
person constructively discharged suffers the same economic injury as a 
“but for the supervisor’s authority qua supervisor, would the harassment have been possible?” 
 158. Reed is the paradigm example of this. Reed was intimidated from reporting the harassment at 
issue primarily because of Appel’s threats. Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 
2003) (“Appel’s supervisory status may have facilitated his harassment”). See supra note 81. Of 
course facilitation is not all that far from aid. 
 159. See infra Part IV. 
 160. Reed, 333 F.3d 27; see also supra Part II.B. 
 161. See, e.g., McCurdy v. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004). The McCurdy 
court found itself forced to undertake such an analysis and concluded, inter alia: 
[W]e critically ask whether Title VII envisions strict employer liability for a supervisor’s 
single incident of sexual harassment when the employer takes swift and effective action to 
insulate the complaining employee from further harassment the moment the employer learns 
about the harassing conduct. As we answer this question, we begin with the obvious 
understanding that the Supreme Court, when it used the Ellerth and Faragher facts to craft 
the two-prong affirmative defense to strict liability, was not addressing an employer who 
takes swift and effective action the minute it learns of a single incident of supervisor sexual 
harassment. Judicially adopted defenses should not be viewed in a vacuum and blindly 
applied to all future cases. Instead, we should analyze these defenses based on the unique 
facts involved in the cases in which courts adopt the defenses. 
Id. at 771. Judge Riley also noted that “[i]t is a fair question to ask who should bear the responsibility 
for a single incident of supervisor sexual harassment, an innocent employee like McCurdy or an 
employer like the A[rkansas] S[tate] P[olice].” Id. at 772. Not only is this a fair question—it is one that 
should be answered in the first instance by the policy-making body best situated to do so: Congress. 
See infra Part IV. 
 162. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (“a constructive discharge is functionally the same as an actual 
termination in damages-enhancing respects.”). 
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person who is terminated, i.e., the loss of her job.163 In similar areas of the 
law, this proposition is well established. For example, under the ADEA,164 
termination and constructive discharge are dealt with using the same 
provisions, and while constructive discharge has its own burden of proof 
issues, the remedies are the same regardless of which is pled and 
proved.165 Furthermore, at least one Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that 
the tangible economic harm involved in a tangible employment action 
might even be lower than that level required to support a constructive 
discharge.166 It seems apparent then that two actions which harm the 
employee in the same manner ought to be treated the same by the law, 
especially because actions such as a demotion or change in work 
assignment affect an employee’s economic status less than do constructive 
discharges or actual terminations.167 
 163. See Melendez-Arroyo v. Cutler Hammer de P.R. Co., 273 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, 
in an ADEA claim, the court ruled that “[o]ften used in cases of racial or sexual harassment, [the 
constructive discharge] doctrine provides a basis for computing damages not based merely on the 
temporary suffering but on the deprivation of employment.” Id. (emphasis added). This is the same 
ground for computing damages when someone is directly fired. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 
539 U.S. 90, 97 (2003) (in a case where the aggrieved employee was fired, “[t]he jury rendered a 
verdict for respondent, awarding backpay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages,” and the 
Supreme Court affirmed this verdict). 
 164. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (as amended), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. 
(2000). In fact, an Iowa District Court came to the same conclusion in December 2003. See Ricklefs v. 
Orman, No. C02-3061-MWB, 2003 WL 23004997 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 19, 2003). Noting the similarities 
between the ADEA and Title VII, the court concluded “the Supreme Court made [it] clear that the 
principles it was articulating applied with equal force in discrimination cases based on Title VII as 
well as in cases based on the ADEA.” Id. at *12 n.9 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 
513 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1995)). 
 165. See Suarez v. Pueblo Intern., Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[a]n employer cannot 
accomplish by indirection what the law prohibits it from doing directly. Just as the ADEA bars an 
employer from dismissing an employee because of his age, so too it bars an employer from engaging 
in a calculated, age-inspired effort to force an employee to quit.”); Young v. Southwestern Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n., 509 F.2d 140, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (“if the employer deliberately makes an employee’s 
working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation, then the 
employer has encompassed a constructive discharge and is as liable for any illegal conduct involved 
therein as if it had formally discharged the aggrieved employee.”); see generally Ira M. Saxe, Note, 
Constructive Discharge Under the ADEA: An Argument for the Intent Standard, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
963, 968 (1987).  
 166. See Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000). The Tenth Circuit first 
recognized that the term tangible employment action was itself vague and “heavy with judicial gloss.” 
Id. at 1231. It continued by pointing out that “[a]lthough the [Supreme Court’s opinion in Ellerth] . . . 
was careful to note that the resultant economic injury must be ‘tangible,’ ‘significant,’ and/or 
‘material,’ it never even hinted that the injury must be of the magnitude necessary to support a 
constructive discharge claim.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 167. The Supreme Court addressed a similar argument in Suders, arguing that the Third Circuit’s 
decision below would make claims of constructive discharge easier to prove than garden variety 
hostile work environment claims. Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2356. This addresses the issue of how evidence 
concerning the affirmative defense would be presented to a jury, e.g., evidence that the employee did 
or did not go through the employer’s procedures for reporting incidents of harassment. Justice 
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Justice Thomas argues that while this may have been the case at some 
point in the history of constructive discharge law, it is no longer the case 
with the more lenient standards he accuses the majority of 
promulgating.168 Because constructive discharge requires no specific intent 
on the part of the employer, he argues that it is not the effective equivalent 
of an actual discharge, which, by its nature, obviously includes specific 
intent.169 While this argument has some force, it seems that the relevant 
inquiry under Title VII is not what an employer intended, but what 
consequences an aggrieved employee suffered and what compensation he 
or she ought to be entitled to. After all, Congress chose to write Title VII, 
as many courts have noted, not as a punitive statute, but as a preventive 
one.170 
C. Prudential Considerations 
The next question to ask is what courts are likely to do in the wake of 
Suders.171 It is useful as a starting point to consider what happens in a suit 
that does not involve constructive discharge but still raises the same 
issues. An employee who alleges hostile work environment sexual 
harassment must plead and prove such an environment existed. The 
employer then may attempt to argue the Ellerth affirmative defense, but 
the employee may protest if there was a tangible employment action. 
Thus, assuming that there was actionable harassment, the inquiry rests on 
whether the employer committed a tangible employment action against the 
employee.172 If so, the analysis is complete. If not, the employer then bears 
the burden of proving the two prongs of the affirmative defense.173 
Ginsburg argued that “[u]nder the Third Circuit’s decision, a jury, presumably, would be cautioned to 
consider the affirmative-defense evidence only in reaching a decision on the hostile work environment 
claim, and to ignore or at least downplay that same evidence in deciding the closely associated 
constructive discharge claim.” Id. 
 168. Id. at 2358 (“[t]he Court has now adopted a definition of constructive discharge, however, 
that does not in the least resemble actual discharge”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 777 (1998) (holding that the affirmative 
defense system “implement[s] Title VII sensibly by giving employers an incentive to prevent and 
eliminate harassment and by requiring employees to take advantage of the preventive or remedial 
apparatus of their employers”). 
 171. See supra note 146 and cases cited therein. 
 172. This is properly understood as a unilateral action on the part of the employer that brings the 
“official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.” Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2353. 
 173. Id. at 2353–54. This burden has been correctly allocated to employers based both on 
mitigation principles and the fact that an “employer is in the best position to know what remedial 
procedures it offers to employees.” Id. at 2354 n.7; see also 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 
(J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss4/12
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When the employee protests that the tangible employment action was 
constructive discharge, the analysis becomes unnecessarily murky. Suders 
instructs that the analysis begins by focusing first on whether a 
constructive discharge occurred, and then proceeds to the question of 
whether an official act was implicated in the discharge.174 The murkiness 
enters the picture when an employer attempts to fight the first part of this 
analysis by introducing evidence to show that no constructive discharge 
occurred, which essentially is the same evidence it would use to prove the 
affirmative defense.175 
IV. PROPOSAL 
On one level it seems a syllogism to say that because Congress wrote 
Title VII, it ought to fix its defects and clarify the judiciary’s interpretation 
of it. On the other hand, judgments about the most efficient and effective 
ways to combat workplace harassment really are best left to the political 
branches—and in this case, to Congress.176 
Title VII was originally passed in 1964, and has been amended six 
times since, most recently in 1991.177 The 1991 amendment included four 
 174. See Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2355 (suggesting that the absence of an official act justifies offering 
the employer the opportunity to use the affirmative defense). 
 175. Id. at 2357. Surprisingly, this part of the Court’s opinion in Suders is its sparsest, consisting 
of only one paragraph instructing that plaintiffs may choose whether to present these types of 
mitigating facts, but ultimately it rests with defendants to plead and prove the specific elements of the 
affirmative defense if it is applicable. 
 The plaintiff still bears the burden of alleging a tangible employment action, but presumably in 
defending a constructive discharge claim on the merits, an employer would counter the plaintiff’s 
claims of reasonableness by introducing evidence that an employee failed to take advantage of easily 
accessible remedial measures. The allocation of burdens may be clear, but how this would play out in a 
trial is still unclear.  
 176. See supra Part III.A. The Supreme Court has noted in recent years that when Congress passes 
a law that takes into account intervening decisions the Supreme Court has made, this makes the 
principle of stare decisis stronger. See supra note 160. 
 177. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964); Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 662 (1966); Pub. L. 
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972); Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978); Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 
Stat. 2679 (1978); Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986); Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991). The 1991 amendment’s findings section stated: 
The Congress finds that— 
(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and 
intentional discrimination in the workplace; 
(2) the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 
(1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections; and 
(3) legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful discrimination 
in employment. 
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Furthermore, Congress attempts to amend Title VII 
on a regular basis. See, e.g., S. 1053, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 
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purposes, one of which was to “respond to recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to 
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”178 Specifically, 
this amendment worked to overrule portions of Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio179 by shifting the burden of persuasion from employees to 
employers in specific circumstances.180 Congress can and should do this 
again. While courts will obviously continue to decide future claims of 
constructive discharge in connection with sexual harassment, deference to 
legislative action will guide courts in the proper direction.181 To be sure, 
Title VII is a complex piece of legislation, but there is room to clarify and 
expand the Supreme Court’s holdings in Ellerth, Faragher, and Suders so 
that adequate protection is provided for victims of workplace 
discrimination.  
Whether constructive discharges should force employers to accept 
strict liability for workplace harassment is, at its core, a normative 
question.182 Based on risk allocation and ability-to-pay principles, 
Congress should emphasize Title VII’s remedial structure and preventive 
purpose. Employers are better positioned not only to take steps to 
eliminate harassment before it rises to the level necessary to substantiate 
constructive discharge, but also better positioned to bear the financial 
burden that comes from rampant harassment. Such legislative emphasis 
2003); S. 1705, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). Perhaps the current political atmosphere stymies these 
attempts for other reasons. Many of these bills attempt to add sexual orientation to the attributes which 
may not be discriminated on the basis of. See, e.g., H.R. 214, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). This may 
explain why these bills do not reach a floor vote. However, a bipartisan compromise can certainly be 
established to protect the rights of workers to be free of forms of discrimination that are already 
prohibited, and which tangibly harm both employees and employers. 
 178. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Certainly this finding pertains to the 
circumstances of this Note as well. 
 179. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 180. See, e.g., Cota v. Tucson Police Dept., 783 F. Supp. 458, 472 n.14 (D. Ariz. 1992) (“In the 
1991 Act, Congress effectively overruled that portion of Wards Cove that lessened an employer’s 
burden once plaintiffs articulate a prima facie case of disparate impact. Congress has now codified the 
higher . . . burden—the burden of production and persuasion”). 
 181. Justice Souter’s opinion in Faragher explicitly notes this deference and accords it worthy 
respect. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998) (“We thus have to assume that 
in expanding employers’ potential liability under Title VII, Congress relied on our statements in 
Meritor about the limits of employer liability. To disregard those statements now . . . would . . . 
substitute our revised judgment . . . for Congress’s considered decision on the subject”). 
 182. This is precisely the point that Justice Scalia made at oral argument in Suders. Suders Oral 
Argument, supra note 137, at **29–30. As Justice Scalia pointed out, in the constructive discharge 
context, there is a line that gets drawn between harassment that does not rise to the level required to 
substantiate a constructive discharge and that which does. His direct question was why there ought to 
be this line, and why harassment that goes over the line ought to make the employer liable without 
regards to the affirmative defense. Id. 
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will best serve the original goals of Title VII, which are as needed today as 
they were forty years ago. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Returning once again to the plight of Rosemary Martin, employees 
similarly situated to her are currently in a precarious position. Depending 
on the progression of precedent in the wake of Suders, employees who 
have been forced from their jobs without explicitly being fired may be in a 
position where no remedy is available to them, while employees who were 
merely transferred to a less attractive assignment or failed to be promoted 
may effectively litigate their claims.183 The dissimilar situation of these 
two groups of employees is evident, and the disparate result they may 
achieve in an attempt to gain redress is unfair. Congress should step into 
this battle now to aid those employees faced with discrimination of the 
type Rosemary Martin faced. Doing so would be a positive step forward in 
eliminating what is today a fatal gap in Title VII’s jurisprudence. 
James M. Weiss* 
 183. See supra note 167. Employees who are transferred may prevent employers from raising the 
affirmative defense because they will have suffered a tangible employment action. Employers of 
supervisors who severely sexually harass subordinates without taking action will still be able to raise 
the affirmative defense in some situations even if the harassment rises to the level necessary to justify 
a constructive discharge. 
 * B.A. Philosophy (2002), University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate (2005), Washington 
University School of Law. I am eternally grateful for the love and support of my wife Amanda and son 
Brennan. Additionally, I must thank J.W. Perry and Neil Richards who both facilitated my attendance 
at the Suders oral argument. 
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